Wire the Blogs integration test host with a real AddJwtBearer
(HS256, IssuerSigningKey shared with the new TestTokenIssuer) and
the production BlogScope policy verbatim, instead of the
TestAuthPolicyProvider / AllowAllAuthorizationService /
NoopAuthHandler stack that short-circuited every authorization
check.
Why: BlogSpotService.Modify calls
IAuthorizationService.AuthorizeAsync(user, blog, EditPermission);
the previous AllowAllAuthorizationService stub made that a
no-op, so the tests could not exercise the real ownership chain
and any change in PermissionHandler would silently slip through.
The new test host registers the real PermissionHandler, so a PUT
that succeeds (204) is now proof that PermissionHandler.IsOwner
accepted the request — i.e. the JWT's sub matched the post's
AuthorId, end-to-end.
Notes for future-me:
- JwtSecurityTokenHandler.DefaultInboundClaimTypeMap.Clear() is
called once on the first Issue() to keep the 'sub' claim
literal; without it UserHelpers.GetUserId (which reads 'sub')
gets ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier instead, returns null, and the
owner check fails for every PUT. The companion
options.MapInboundClaims = false on the validation pipeline
keeps both sides in sync.
- Production still uses AddYavscJwtBearer against the OIDC
authority; the test-only HS256 path is local to the test
process and never crosses a network boundary.
Coverage:
- GetBlog_returns_401_when_no_token_is_provided — anonymous
request, real policy fails closed.
- PutBlog_with_valid_token_and_owner_returns_204_and_Get_
reflects_update — POST then PUT then GET, all behind a real
JWT, asserting 204 + list contains the updated title.
Packages added to Directory.Packages.props at 8.2.1 to match
what Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 10.0.9 already
transitively pulls in (no version drift).
107 lines
4.2 KiB
C#
107 lines
4.2 KiB
C#
using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt;
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using System.Security.Claims;
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using System.Text;
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using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
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namespace Yavsc.Tests.Shared;
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/// <summary>
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/// Mints HS256-signed JWTs for integration tests. The signing key is
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/// held in a static field shared with the test host's
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/// <c>AddJwtBearer</c> registration: whatever the host validates
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/// against, this issuer signs with.
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///
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/// <para>
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/// HS256 (symmetric) is the right choice for a unit-test issuer:
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/// no key generation ceremony, no PEM round-trip, no asymmetric
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/// crypto on the hot path. The key never leaves the test process.
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/// Production continues to validate against the OIDC authority via
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/// <c>AddYavscJwtBearer</c> — this issuer is *only* for the
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/// in-process test host.
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/// </para>
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/// </summary>
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public static class TestTokenIssuer
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{
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/// <summary>
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/// Symmetric signing key shared with the test host's
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/// <c>TokenValidationParameters.IssuerSigningKey</c>.
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/// 32 bytes of zeros is enough entropy for HS256 *within the test
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/// process*; the assertion we care about is "does the policy
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/// evaluate a properly-signed token", not "is the key unguessable
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/// by an attacker" (there is no attacker here).
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/// </summary>
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public static readonly SymmetricSecurityKey SigningKey =
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new SymmetricSecurityKey(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(new string('k', 32)));
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/// <summary>
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/// Issuer stamped into the <c>iss</c> claim and checked by the
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/// test host. Must match
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/// <c>TokenValidationParameters.ValidIssuer</c>.
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/// </summary>
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public const string Issuer = "yavsc-test-issuer";
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/// <summary>
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/// Audience stamped into the <c>aud</c> claim. The test host
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/// does not validate audience (production may), so this is here
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/// for shape only.
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/// </summary>
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public const string Audience = "yavsc-test";
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private static bool _inboundClaimTypeMapCleared;
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/// <summary>
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/// Mint a JWT carrying the given <paramref name="subject"/> as
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/// the <c>sub</c> claim, a single <c>scope</c> claim with value
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/// <paramref name="scope"/>, and any additional
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/// <paramref name="extraClaims"/>. Token is valid for one hour
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/// from now.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="subject">Value of the <c>sub</c> claim. Read
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/// back by <c>UserHelpers.GetUserId</c>, which is how
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/// <c>PermissionHandler.IsOwner</c> identifies the author of a
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/// <c>BlogPost</c> on PUT.</param>
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/// <param name="scope">Value of the <c>scope</c> claim. The
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/// production <c>BlogScope</c> policy requires
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/// <c>RequireClaim("scope", "blogs")</c>.</param>
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/// <param name="extraClaims">Optional additional claims
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/// (e.g. a role for an admin-bypass test).</param>
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public static string Issue(
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string subject,
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string scope = "blogs",
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IEnumerable<Claim>? extraClaims = null)
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{
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var now = DateTime.UtcNow;
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var claims = new List<Claim>
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{
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new("sub", subject),
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new("scope", scope),
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};
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if (extraClaims is not null) claims.AddRange(extraClaims);
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// JwtSecurityTokenHandler ships with a static
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// DefaultInboundClaimTypeMap that rewrites short JWT claim
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// names to their long Microsoft URIs at deserialisation
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// time. The most relevant rewrite for us is
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// "sub" → ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier. Without clearing the
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// map, UserHelpers.GetUserId() — which reads the literal
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// "sub" claim — would not find the value, PermissionHandler
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// .IsOwner would compare against null, and the controller
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// would return 401 on every PUT. Clearing is the standard
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// way to opt out of the legacy mapping.
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if (!_inboundClaimTypeMapCleared)
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{
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JwtSecurityTokenHandler.DefaultInboundClaimTypeMap.Clear();
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_inboundClaimTypeMapCleared = true;
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}
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var creds = new SigningCredentials(SigningKey, SecurityAlgorithms.HmacSha256);
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var token = new JwtSecurityToken(
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issuer: Issuer,
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audience: Audience,
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claims: claims,
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notBefore: now,
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expires: now.AddHours(1),
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signingCredentials: creds);
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return new JwtSecurityTokenHandler().WriteToken(token);
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}
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}
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