122 lines
5.2 KiB
C#
122 lines
5.2 KiB
C#
using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt;
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using System.Security.Claims;
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using System.Text;
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using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
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namespace Yavsc.Tests.Shared;
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/// <summary>
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/// Mints HS256-signed JWTs for integration tests. The signing key is
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/// held in a static field shared with the test host's
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/// <c>AddJwtBearer</c> registration: whatever the host validates
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/// against, this issuer signs with.
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///
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/// <para>
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/// HS256 (symmetric) is the right choice for a unit-test issuer:
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/// no key generation ceremony, no PEM round-trip, no asymmetric
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/// crypto on the hot path. The key never leaves the test process.
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/// Production continues to validate against the OIDC authority via
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/// <c>AddYavscJwtBearer</c> — this issuer is *only* for the
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/// in-process test host.
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/// </para>
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/// </summary>
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public static class TestTokenIssuer
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{
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/// <summary>
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/// Symmetric signing key shared with the test host's
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/// <c>TokenValidationParameters.IssuerSigningKey</c>.
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/// 32 bytes of zeros is enough entropy for HS256 *within the test
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/// process*; the assertion we care about is "does the policy
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/// evaluate a properly-signed token", not "is the key unguessable
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/// by an attacker" (there is no attacker here).
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/// </summary>
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public static readonly SymmetricSecurityKey SigningKey =
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new SymmetricSecurityKey(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(new string('k', 32)));
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/// <summary>
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/// Issuer stamped into the <c>iss</c> claim and checked by the
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/// test host. Must match
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/// <c>TokenValidationParameters.ValidIssuer</c>.
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/// </summary>
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public const string Issuer = "yavsc-test-issuer";
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/// <summary>
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/// Audience stamped into the <c>aud</c> claim. The test host
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/// does not validate audience (production may), so this is here
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/// for shape only.
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/// </summary>
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public const string Audience = "yavsc-test";
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private static bool _inboundClaimTypeMapCleared;
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/// <summary>
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/// Mint a JWT carrying the given <paramref name="subject"/> as
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/// the <c>sub</c> claim, a single <c>scope</c> claim with value
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/// <paramref name="scope"/>, and any additional
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/// <paramref name="extraClaims"/>. Token is valid for one hour
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/// from now.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="subject">Value of the <c>sub</c> claim. Read
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/// back by <c>UserHelpers.GetUserId</c>, which is how
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/// <c>PermissionHandler.IsOwner</c> identifies the author of a
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/// <c>BlogPost</c> on PUT.</param>
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/// <param name="scope">Value of the <c>scope</c> claim. The
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/// production <c>BlogScope</c> policy requires
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/// <c>RequireClaim("scope", "blogs")</c>.</param>
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/// <param name="name">Value of the <c>name</c> claim. Defaults to
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/// <paramref name="subject"/> (the test convention where the login
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/// equals the subject). Pass a distinct login to mirror production,
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/// where <c>sub</c> is a GUID and <c>name</c> is the user's
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/// <c>UserName</c> — the file-system list/upload paths key the
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/// personal-storage tree off the login, not the subject.</param>
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/// <param name="extraClaims">Optional additional claims
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/// (e.g. a role for an admin-bypass test).</param>
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public static string Issue(
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string subject,
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string scope = "blogs",
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string? name = null,
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IEnumerable<Claim>? extraClaims = null)
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{
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var now = DateTime.UtcNow;
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var claims = new List<Claim>
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{
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new("sub", subject),
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// Mirror production: IdentityServer's ProfileService emits the
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// "name" claim as the user's login (UserName) when the profile
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// scope is granted, and the file-system helpers resolve the
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// per-user storage root via GetUserName() (FindFirstValue("name"))
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// — not via User.Identity.Name. A test token without "name" would
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// make ReceiveUserFile / EnsureDestinationDirectory compute a
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// null owner root and 500 on upload, so stamp it here.
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new("name", name ?? subject),
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new("scope", scope),
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};
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if (extraClaims is not null) claims.AddRange(extraClaims);
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// JwtSecurityTokenHandler ships with a static
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// DefaultInboundClaimTypeMap that rewrites short JWT claim
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// names to their long Microsoft URIs at deserialisation
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// time. The most relevant rewrite for us is
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// "sub" → ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier. Without clearing the
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// map, UserHelpers.GetUserId() — which reads the literal
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// "sub" claim — would not find the value, PermissionHandler
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// .IsOwner would compare against null, and the controller
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// would return 401 on every PUT. Clearing is the standard
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// way to opt out of the legacy mapping.
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if (!_inboundClaimTypeMapCleared)
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{
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JwtSecurityTokenHandler.DefaultInboundClaimTypeMap.Clear();
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_inboundClaimTypeMapCleared = true;
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}
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var creds = new SigningCredentials(SigningKey, SecurityAlgorithms.HmacSha256);
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var token = new JwtSecurityToken(
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issuer: Issuer,
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audience: Audience,
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claims: claims,
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notBefore: now,
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expires: now.AddHours(1),
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signingCredentials: creds);
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return new JwtSecurityTokenHandler().WriteToken(token);
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}
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}
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